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Abstract 
During the 1960s, different critical voices emerged with regard to the main gaps of technocratic planning (what 
Jacobs calls ‘modern, orthodox city planning’), voices highlighting the oversimplifying epistemological approaches 
that had been characterising planning in the first half of the twentieth century. Jane Jacobs’ thought has been of 
paramount importance in influencing planning and urban discourses worldwide, but she has not been isolated: in 
the same years, other critical voices have been shaping a critical thought and fostering debate, on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Among them, Paul Davidoff, appealing for advocacy planning in NYC, Giancarlo De Carlo, proposing a sharp 
critique of architectural and planning education in Italy and Reyner Banham and his group, advocating the (paradoxi-
cal) possibility of non-planning in the UK. This article proposes to identify a relevant common feature across their 
positions in the connection between epistemological and political critique; as Jane Jacobs, many critics of traditional 
technocratic planning underline the inappropriate and ineffective mechanisms of knowledge production and use 
in urban planning: if cities are characterised by organised complexity (‘intricate social and economic order under the 
seeming disorder of cities’, as Jacobs puts it), then it is not possible to reduce them to ‘simple problems’. These authors 
develop their interpretative discourses in different ways, and advance different proposals to bridge this gap, combin-
ing in original ways the epistemological dimension with a political and a cultural one.
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Introduction
Jane Jacobs’ position on the use of rationality (Jacobs 
1961; Callahan and Ikeda 2014; Laurence 2016) and on 
the over-reliance on scientific and technical reason-
ing in urban planning and urban regeneration policies 
has been of great importance for its consequences on 
the planning and urban studies debate, but it is by no 
means isolated in the 1960s. Interestingly enough, dif-
ferent scholars and activists from quite different dis-
ciplinary and political backgrounds expressed quite 
similar critiques to the knowledge-action connection in 
the traditional technocratic planning model, contributing 
with their arguments to pave the way for a sort of episte-
mological ‘revolution’ in planning theory and practice in 
the subsequent decades, anticipating to some extent the 
scientific and philosophical critiques to positivist epis-
temology that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (De Roo 
2010; Palermo and Ponzini 2014). Also thanks to Jacobs 
and other critics, in recent years there is a shared aware-
ness that.
“The problems of architecture and urban planning 
today relate primarily to ends and effects rather 
than to technique (and the main limit is not the 
eventual lack of scientific background). These posi-
tions are supported by the evolution of epistemo-
logical thinking that has long since abandoned any 
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pretence of absolute foundation to recognize the cul-
tural, ethical and social grounds that contribute to 
the formation of judgments of truth” (Palermo and 
Ponzini 2014, p. 61).
Among the vast array of emerging voices, criticising 
the epistemological gap that characterises much planning 
theory and practice in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the article will focus on the positions and arguments 
of Paul Davidoff in the US, Giancarlo De Carlo in Italy 
and Paul Barker, Reyner Banham and a group of other 
intellectuals in the UK. Their positions appear quite 
interesting in relation to Jacobs’s one, because they share 
some relevant elements with her critique, but each of 
them introduces a specific and contextual angle to their 
argument.
There are two main elements in common among the 
different positions: the first one is the critical discussion 
of the intrinsic limits of positivist rationality, especially 
when it is applied to contexts such as urban planning; as 
Palermo and Ponzini observe, this critique has signifi-
cantly influenced the ideal of radical modernisation pro-
jects, both in architecture and in urban planning:
“the experience of modernity has revealed ambigui-
ties and paradoxes in the traditional aspiration to 
scientifically establishing public action. The modern 
project has lost its radical desire for the emancipa-
tion and development of human capabilities; what 
has remained instead is the social reproduction of 
various rationalization technologies (Palermo and 
Ponzini 2014, p. 61)
The second common element is an attempt to unveil 
the opaque connection between epistemology and poli-
tics, and ultimately to critically reflect on the role of 
power in policy making and planning.
Jacobs very clearly highlights the point introducing 
the ‘organised complexity’ concept, which calls for a 
completely different form of knowledge production and 
mobilisation compared to the ones which target sim-
ple problems, or problems of disorganised complexity 
(Jacobs 1961; Laurence 2016). Impinging on Weaver’s 
examination of the evolution of natural sciences in the 
preceding half century (Weaver 1958), she proposes to 
decisively go beyond both the traditional epistemology 
of simple problems connected to Newtonian physics, and 
the statistical approach to disorganised complexity, to 
move to a perspective closer to the life sciences (‘organ-
ised complexity’). From this attention to the life sciences 
derives the metaphor of the city as an organic being, use-
ful to understand how the city develops and therefore to 
identify the possible strategic directions for its develop-
ment in a normative perspective.
“Cities present situations in which a half-dozen 
or even several dozen quantities are all varying 
simultaneously and in subtly interconnected ways. 
Cities, again like the life sciences, do not exhibit 
one problem in organized complexity, which if 
understood explains all. They can be analyzed into 
many such problems or segments which, as in the 
case of the life sciences, are also related with one 
another. The variables are many, but they are not 
helter-skelter; they are interrelated into an organic 
whole” (Jacobs 1961, p. 433)
One first entry point into this argument is the 
acknowledgement of the different sources of urban 
knowledge, and of the fact that they are necessarily 
dispersed among a large number of actors, all poten-
tially users and designers at the same time. As noted 
by Moroni when he discusses the relationship between 
knowledge and markets ‘it is impossible to intention-
ally concentrate the dispersed knowledge that enables 
complex economic systems to function’ (Moroni 2014, 
p. 15), because this knowledge has three fundamental 
features: it is situated, therefore specific in space and 
time, it is tacit, which means that it is acquired through 
forms of learning-by-doing and not formally codified, 
and thirdly it is dynamic, which means that it changes 
over time; the impossibility to intentionally concentrate 
and make this knowledge ‘public’, calls for more direct 
forms of societal involvement and direct experimenta-
tion (ibidem).
Secondly, whereas one of technocratic planning’s fun-
damental tenets was the declared ‘neutrality’ of techni-
cal decisions vis-à-vis the political dimension of society 
(be it read as an interest-based pluralist society, or in 
other perspectives), Jane Jacobs and the other authors 
in the 1960s, insist on the inherently political dimen-
sion of planning choices (and, more in general, of pol-
icy making) and on the limits of the instrumental use of 
technical expertise, which contributes to distort infor-
mation and knowledge and to impose simplistic solu-
tions to complex societal problems. The unveiling of 
this power connection is very clear in Paul Davidoff ’s 
call for openly partisan planning positions, as well as in 
De Carlo’s oriented critique of the role of architecture 
and planning knowledge in society, and therefore of 
technical education and training.
Thus the epistemological critique becomes also a 
political critique, even if this dimension is differently 
present in the critical discourses. The positions are 
nuanced in the four authors, and the political side to the 
critique might emerge more or less explicitly, while for 
instance it is frequently implicit in Jacobs, who mani-
fests an interest in urban economic and social vitality 
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from a substantive point of view (Laurence 2016, 2018), 
more than a specific interest in decision-making and in 
the process dimension.
The following paragraphs will first highlight the main 
recurring features of the technocratic planning model, 
looking in particular at the knowledge-action nexus 
and at the ambiguities in the relations with the politi-
cal dimension, and then they will focus on the nature of 
some ‘critical voices’ of the 1960s, trying to identify the 
most significant commonalities and differences with Jane 
Jacob’s thought. Finally, the conclusions will summarise 
the previous arguments also in the light of some recent 
developments of planning theory vis-à-vis the mentioned 
critiques.
Emerging features of technocratic planning 
in the first half of the twentieth century
Under the rather wide and comprehensive definition of 
technocratic planning we can gather a number of theo-
retical positions and practical experimentations, which 
emerged in Continental Europe in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and in the US around the first decades 
of the twentieth century (Benevolo 1967; Boyer 1983), 
aiming at establishing the (public) legitimacy and at set-
ting the ground rules and specific guidelines for urban 
planning; this last therefore gained status as an activity 
and a discipline separated from civil and sanitary engi-
neering on the one side and from Beaux Arts and monu-
ment design on the other. This technocratic planning 
perspective had a significant and long-lasting influence 
on urban planning and design throughout the twentieth 
century, notwithstanding a series of well-argued and, 
from a certain point in time, extremely diffused critiques. 
According to Moroni technocratic planners.
believe themselves able to gather and analyse a 
priori and in quantitative terms the relevant infor-
mation regarding the city. They consider themselves 
able to rely on specific predictions of future events. 
Thanks to this kind of competence, planners pre-
sume that they are able to design the desired urban 
end-state and to define, as precisely as feasible, tar-
get sites for particular uses (Moroni 2018, p. 145)
The evolution of technocratic planning has followed 
slightly different paths in European and American cities, 
due to their different cultural, political and institutional 
conditions; we will recall here some of the fundamen-
tal tenets of technocratic planning in the US, using the 
works of some pioneers such as Lewis and Howe, bearing 
in mind that some of the issues are present across both 
contexts.
First, planning can be conceived at the same time as 
‘foresight’ or ‘remedy’, as proposed for instance by Lewis 
(1916) in that it may be an anticipation of the inevitable 
accumulation of negative externalities deriving from the 
uncontrolled growth of the industrial city, or it can be 
conceived as a correction, an ex-post attempt at mini-
mising the worst (public) impacts of such evolution. ‘City 
Planning is simply the exercise of such foresight as will 
promote the orderly and sightly development of a city 
and its environs along rational lines’ (Lewis 1916, p. 11). 
Or, according to Howe, City Planning ‘anticipates the 
future with the farsightedness of an army commander, 
so as to secure the orderly, harmonious, and symmetrical 
development of the community’ (Howe 1913, p. 1).
To work in this direction, the city comes to be con-
sidered as a tool, as a machine useful for the production 
process: ‘The process of planning conceives of the city as 
an instrument of capitalist development. Now the nature 
of the city is to be a functional tool, a machine useful to 
the process of production’ (Boyer 1983, p. 66).
Secondly, sometimes in open opposition with what city 
design had been in the nineteenth century, technocratic 
planning legitimises (albeit not without contention) 
public intervention also on private land, and therefore 
the possibility to dictate rules and restrictions to private 
owners, in the form of zoning (firstly concerning heights, 
setbacks and building ratios, then also land-uses). This 
is a huge discontinuity with the past, and one of the ele-
ments of recurring critique along the subsequent dec-
ades. On this point Howe observes: ‘City planning, in a 
comprehensive sense, is only possible where the city has 
authority to control private property in the interest of the 
community’ (Howe 1913, p. 2).
In intervening on the city, technocratic planning intro-
duces a new epistemology, based on the idea that the 
production and elaboration of knowledge should pre-
cede action, in line with positivistic epistemology gain-
ing ground in many scientific fields in the same age: this 
traditional knowledge-action connection has had a long 
lasting and enduring influence over planning throughout 
the twentieth century, and it somehow resists post-posi-
tivist critiques still today.
On this point, Howe very clearly states: ‘City planning 
involves a new vision of the city. It means a city built by 
experts, by experts in architecture, in landscape garden-
ing, in engineering, and housing, by students of health, 
sanitation, transportation, water, gas, and electricity sup-
ply’ (ibidem).
This simplification of the knowledge-action nexus and 
the rigid model of rationality that therefore crystallises in 
planning thought is at odds with the recognition of multi-
ple forms of rationality, as for instance Schmitt and Hart-
mann argue, with reference to Mary Douglas’ thought 
and to Cultural Theory (Schmitt and Hartmann 2016). 
The tensions between a dominant form of rationality 
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and a plurality of rationalities characterises, on the other 
hand, the evolution of modernity itself: ‘the discovery of 
multiple forms of reason was an achievement of moder-
nity obscured, however, by the widespread search for a 
dominant form of rationality’ (Palermo and Ponzini 2014, 
p. 61).
One typical example of the use of technical knowledge 
in simplifying the inquiry about cities is the emerging 
attitude to break down cities, and therefore planning pro-
cesses, into systems, firstly those concerning public activ-
ities and initiatives, and then also those concerning the 
‘private’ city. Authors in this period mention the trans-
portation system, the street system, parks and recreation 
facilities, public buildings and civic centres, the railroad 
system. In subsequent years, also the residential system, 
the production system, and so on, will be identified as the 
foundational bases of ‘scientific’ planning.
Connecting epistemology and politics: critiques 
to planning in the 1960s
In the years after the publication of Death and Life of 
Great American Cities, different critical voices within 
and outside the urban planning field critically discussed 
the points so clearly highlighted by Jane Jacobs, in some 
cases in direct connection with her thought, in others 
independently: among the many interesting ones, we will 
discuss in particular Davidoff’s, Barker and Banham’s, 
and De Carlo’s ones.
Paul Davidoff’s very famous and extensively quoted 
article on advocacy and pluralism in planning, appeared 
in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners in 
1965, the same year of Alan Altschuler’s critique of plan-
ning theory and practice in the US (Altshuler 1965). Its 
content is significantly influenced by the racial and class 
tensions emerging in American society and politics in 
the first half of the 1960s, as well as by classical plural-
ist though (as expressed for instance by Dahl 1961). The 
core of Davidoff’s critique to technocratic planning is at 
the same time epistemological and political, or to put it 
more clearly, it is political insofar as it is epistemological. 
Davidoff criticises the traditional planning routine which 
brings an individual planner or planning office to develop 
different alternatives, because each alternative course of 
action should be connected to underlying goals and value 
systems: ‘Appropriate planning action cannot be pre-
scribed from a position of value neutrality, for prescrip-
tions are based on desired objectives’ (Davidoff 1965, p. 
331).
The pretended neutrality of the rational model, based 
on the careful analysis of urban issues and problems, the 
development of a set of alternatives and the choice of 
the best alternative according to sets of ‘technical’ crite-
ria unveils here its intrinsic political dimension: if values 
are not made explicit, they will tend to correspond to 
the value systems of the government or public agencies. 
Hence the proposal of an adversarial planning system, in 
which plans are designed on the basis of explicitly differ-
ent interests and values, and are subsequently compared 
and defended in a public discussion arena: ‘In plural 
planning the alternatives would be presented by inter-
est groups differing with the public agency’s plan. Such 
alternatives would represent the deep-seated convictions 
of their proponents and not just the mental exercises of 
rational planners seeking to portray the range of choice’ 
(Davidoff 1965, p. 333).
The intrinsic quality of each different plan proposal 
would be much higher, because they would be the result 
of specific decentralised knowledge gathering efforts, 
thus relying on the mobilisation of situated, tacit and 
dynamic knowledge (to use Moroni’s criteria), and 
because they would propose solutions consistent with the 
underlying value systems of different actors, so that goals 
would be connected explicitly to the means employed to 
reach them.
A quite different stance characterises the Non-Plan 
proposal, advanced in 1969 on New Society by four Brit-
ish intellectuals active in the fields of sociology, architec-
ture, urban design and geography. The style of the article 
is ironic and paradoxical, as the proposal advocated is to 
leave parts of the UK territory unplanned, and to subse-
quently check, after some time, the results in terms of 
quality of the built environment and quality of life of local 
communities. Such an idea is to a certain extent extreme, 
but the core of the argument stands out quite clearly:
“… physical planning, like anything else, should con-
sist at most of setting up frameworks for decision, 
within which as much objective information as pos-
sible can be fitted. Non-Plan would certainly provide 
such information. But it might do more. Even to talk 
of a ‘general framework’ is difficult. Our information 
about future states of the system is very poor” (Ban-
ham et al. 1969, p. 442).
The critique to the actual epistemology of planning 
clearly emerges here, but the evaluation of the very poor 
results of planning control in the UK brings the authors 
one step further, to question the legitimacy of (urban) 
planning at all, and to ask themselves if lifting planning 
restrictions and leaving land use and design decisions 
free would in the end produce an environment worse 
than the one they were witnessing. After a fictional appli-
cation of Non-Plan to three actual areas, the final part of 
the article summarises the main lines of critique to tech-
nocratic planning, as it has been developing in the UK 
in the interwar period and after WW2 (especially after 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act). The main 
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critique here is about the pretence of planners to impose 
value-based and aesthetical judgements on other people’s 
decisions: such imposition is problematic, because even 
planner’s judgements are approximate and not founded 
on sound and reliable evaluations. Reflecting on the effect 
that Jane Jacobs’ positions on the rigidity of technocratic 
planning should have had on planning culture in the UK, 
but in fact had not, the authors thus observe:
“The planning system, as now constituted in Britain, 
is not merely negative. It has positively pernicious 
results. The irony is that the planners themselves 
consistently talk – since the appearance of Jane 
Jacob’s Death and Life of Great American Cities – 
about the need to restore spontaneity and vitality to 
urban life. They never seem to draw the obvious con-
clusion – that the monuments of our century that 
have spontaneity and vitality are found not in the 
old cities, but in the American west” (Banham et al. 
1969, p. 443).
Perhaps surprisingly, in the defence of the spatial and 
formal effects of the diffusion of pop culture, the exam-
ple mentioned is that of Las Vegas, 3  years before the 
publication of Venturi and Scott Brown’s pamphlet (Ven-
turi et  al. 1972). Interestingly enough, significant links 
between Venturi’s perspective (in particular in Complex-
ity and Contradiction in Architecture, 1966) and that of 
Jane Jacobs herself have been explored in literature, for 
instance by Peter Laurence, who argues that Venturi’s 
book can be seen as a sort of sequel to Death and Life of 
Great American Cities (Laurence 2006, p. 49).
Going back to re-discuss the Non-Plan proposal after 
30 years, and re-examining the main features of the Brit-
ish suburban landscape in a Non-Plan perspective, Paul 
Barker confirms the validity of the original approach 
when he writes:
“I have increasingly come to endorse the conclusions 
we came to, all those years ago. Growth that happens 
without too much prescription is best. It is, of course, 
fine to lay down some very basic negative rules, and 
Non-Plan was never hostile to this; for example, this 
belt of land shall not be built on; or no building in 
this city centre shall be higher than ten storeys.
But, outside that, as little should be done as possi-
ble. Positive planning is all too often a disaster. For 
a start, it is usually based on incorrect forecasts 
about the future. No one is clever enough to know, in 
advance, how cities will grow” (Barker 1999, p. 108)
Here again we can find echoes of the post-positivist 
epistemological critique that so many authors have been 
proposing.
Finally, Giancarlo De Carlo in a 1969 conference (later 
published in English) (De Carlo 2005), vibrantly criticises 
the social role and the technical legitimacy of architec-
ture (and hence urban planning), paying a specific atten-
tion to the educational dimension. De Carlo belongs to 
a quite heterogeneous group of architects and planners 
who worked through the 1960s to a critical approach vis-
à-vis mainstream urban planning in Italy; among them 
we can also mention Ludovico Quaroni and Giuseppe 
Samonà, both of whom tried to introduce innovations 
and different perspectives in planning, mobilising dif-
ferent knowledge forms, paying attention to the soci-
etal aspects and fostering a stricter relationship with the 
urban design dimension, compared to mainstream con-
temporary planning (Di Biagi and Gabellini 1992).
Uprisings and revolts in universities, diffused on both 
sides of the Atlantic in 1967–1968, had been in fact antic-
ipated in Italian Schools of Architecture as early as 1964 
(De Carlo 1968; Granata and Pacchi 2009). This anticipa-
tion can be connected, according to De Carlo, to the lack 
of legitimacy that architectural knowledge had in the eyes 
of students in the 1960s, due to two unsolved problems: 
the substantial failure of a never perfectly matched merge 
between Beaux Arts academic education and technologi-
cal education on the one side, and the very old and con-
servative attitude of such schools, which resulted in their 
inability to tackle the most pressing societal problems.
The main point of De Carlo’s critique focuses on the 
artificial and oppressive distinction between designer 
and user, both at architecture and urban planning scale 
‘Architecture has become too important to be left to 
architects’ (De Carlo 2005, p. 13). Such distinction should 
be blurred in a very different design process, able to 
actively involve a variety of actors and stakeholders:
“But identifying with the user’s needs does not mean 
planning ‘for’ them, but planning ‘with’ them. In 
other words it means enlarging the field of partici-
pation through the definition and use of the plan, 
introducing into the system a whole set of complex 
variables which could never be composed into bal-
anced situations except with procedural systems 
based on a continual alternation of observations, 
propositions, and evaluations; i.e. the use of scien-
tific method” (De Carlo 2005, p. 15).
At the heart of De Carlo’s proposal there is an idea 
of process planning, based on complex and iterative 
interaction patterns between designers and users, with 
the objective to blur this divide and more effectively 
(and justly) develop design proposals. The relation-
ship between technical knowledge and other knowledge 
forms (milieu, local, daily knowledge) can be described 
here as a continuous tension between different polarities, 
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very different from the traditional technocratic models as 
well as from the most banal interpretations of participa-
tory planning.
Conclusion. Elements of lasting influence 
on the planning debate?
Looking back at Jane Jacobs’ ideas and at other impor-
tant critical voices after 50  years, we can ask what the 
planning discipline has learnt from them, in which way 
their first insights and suggestions have become nodes of 
theoretical reflection and in which directions they have 
been elaborated further. In a short paper as this one it 
will not be possible to consistently list and discuss all the 
new directions in planning theory which can be directly 
or indirectly connected to these voices: we will therefore 
pick up a couple of points, (somewhat arbitrarily) iden-
tifying some interesting developments, and leaving the 
wider questions open for further discussion.
Reflecting in perspective, two issues seem to emerge as 
particularly relevant: the core of the epistemological cri-
tique, underlying the problems inherent in recurring to 
simplifying versions of technical and scientific rationality, 
and the ambiguous relationship, which takes place in the 
public domain, between technical rationality, knowledge 
production and power. Both are the object of in depth 
reflections in Innes and Booher’s book on the relation-
ship between planning, decision making and complex-
ity (Innes and Booher 2010), so we will move from their 
interpretations of the debate to bring the line of argu-
ment one step further.
On the first point, following Jacobs, the oversimplifica-
tion in the explanations of causal links in urban analysis 
(‘simple problems’) leads to oversimplify the proposed 
solutions, and to the dominance of a technical solution-
driven approach over a thoroughly critical perspective. 
In this sense, ‘there is no need to appeal to 1970s “nega-
tive thinking” to recognize that instrumental reason 
alone cannot drive social evolution towards sustainable 
and progressive targets’ as Palermo and Ponzini (2014, 
p. 61) put it. Jacobs and the other authors we discussed 
anticipated to some extent, in relation to urban planning 
issues, philosophical critiques to traditional positivist 
epistemology that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (Bern-
stein 1991).
Moreover, complexity studies (Stengers 2000) sig-
nificantly put the accent on the importance of learning 
processes (single and double-loop, individual and collec-
tive), thus introducing a dynamic dimension in the pro-
duction and use of knowledge, which both Jane Jacobs 
(Laurence 2016) and Giancarlo De Carlo advocated for 
planning processes. The mobilisation of different knowl-
edge forms in complex interactive processes, at the basis 
of many developments in planning thought in the 1980s 
and 1990s, finds here one of its roots (Innes and Booher 
2010). According to De Roo, eventually, this true para-
digm shift, a sort of scientific revolution, resulted in a 
change in planners’ approaches, which took place around 
1990 (De Roo 2010, 2017).
On the second point, the understanding of planning 
as an activity being influenced by the public domain and 
contributing in turn to shape it (Friedmann 1987), and 
its complex relationship with ideas of democracy and 
citizenship, and ultimately power, with very different 
ideological orientations (among others, Fung and Wright 
2003; Harvey 2012; Mazza 2016), have been a corner-
stone of planning debate in the last 30 years, also through 
the mediation of different conceptions of the public 
interest (Alexander 2002). While it is not possible to 
reconstruct in depth such an articulated debate in these 
conclusions, the critical insights opened up in the 1960s 
by authors such as Jane Jacobs and others, have certainly 
been crucial in structuring its main epistemological and 
political axes.
Looking at specific examples, among other perspec-
tives, collaborative planning theory has since long elab-
orated and looked deeply into the very initial insight 
that the neutrality pretence had an intrinsic oppressive 
dimension, related to systems of power, proposed by 
Jacobs and other critical voices in the 1960s in a some-
what less systematic way (Forester 1982;  Forester 1989; 
Healey 1997; Fainstein 2000).
As John Forester would summarise a couple of decades 
later, ‘The planners’ speech acts perform both technical 
and political work’ (Forester 1980, p. 278). According 
to Forester and others, the claim to neutrality becomes 
problematic because either planners and technical 
experts are aware that they’re not being neutral, or they 
do not acknowledge the limits of technocratic rationality: 
in Forester’s words, this has to do with two typical forms 
of communicative distortion, which negatively impact on 
the sincerity and on the truth of the planning discourse 
(ibidem). In turn, this type of discursive distortions are 
intrinsically political, in that they are connected to spe-
cific features of the planning process, aimed at excluding 
dissenting voices: ‘Echoing the work of Karl Mannheim 
and John Dewey, Habermas’ argument implies that such 
distortions are increasingly likely in planning if planners 
become more removed from a democratic planning pro-
cess’ (Forester 1980, p. 281).
Innes and Booher call for the exploration of forms of 
alternative rationality in collaborative planning, on the 
basis of three main arguments, deeply connected with 
the epistemological and political accents of the critiques 
we’ve been discussing. The first point is that collective 
processes aimed at building collaborative rationality 
increase the chances of mutual learning, which in turn 
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can guarantee a stronger resilience of decisions in the 
face of complex and ‘tragic’ dilemmas of collective deci-
sion (Innes and Booher 2010, p. 9).
The second point focuses on how collaborative decision 
making processes are designed and managed, thus trying 
to identify some basic, common criteria against which to 
distinguish the appropriateness and effectiveness of dif-
ferent approaches.
Thirdly, Innes and Booher argue that collaborative pro-
cesses can trigger double-loop learning and can thus have 
positive effects on the wider decision making context in 
which they take place, again positively impacting on the 
overall resilience of decisions (p. 10).
The authors underline ‘how know-how—even the 
presumably objective, scientific kind—is constructed 
through a social process’ (Innes and Booher 2010, p. 23), 
but this is not enough to ensure that social processes per 
se are able to guarantee sound and legitimate knowledge 
production with regard to choices in the public realm. 
Again, the reference to the Frankfurt school, and the con-
stant attention to the way power relations shape ‘under-
standings, theories, assumptions, and language’ are but 
a first step to overcome such inherent distortions and to 
more firmly ground planning processes in democratic 
debate.
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